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PRE-EMPTION AND THE LABOR REFORM ACT-
DUAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
CLYDE W. SuMMERs*
Labor lawyers have learned from experience the inherent com-
plexity of law-making in a federal system and the difficulties of antici-
pating the problems created by radiations of national regulation. Hill
v. Florida,1 which held that a state statute licensing business agents
conflicted with national protection of employees' free choice of bar-
gaining representatives, demonstrated the reach and destructive power
of those radiations. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Re-
lations Board,2 which barred New York from certifying a bargaining
unit of foremen, suggested the presence of invisible radiations from
denial of national protections. Congress in 1947 could not foresee,
however, the problems projected by these decisions, particularly when
federal law was changed from the unilateral limitations of the Wagner
Act to the bilateral limitations of Taft-Hartley.3 The still-born cession
clause of section 10(a) and the piecemeal provisions of section 14
proved wholly inadequate.4 Comprehensive national regulation carried
unexpected implications for state law. Garner v. Teamsters Union5
found in the picketing provisions an implied prohibition of state re-
straints; and Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board6 held that the ces-
sion clause designed to encourage cooperation between federal and
state governments created a "no man's land" between them. The
"Delphic nature' 7 of Congressional silence has worked unexpected
results," and the "process of litigating elucidation"9 has shed but a
* Professor of Law, Yale University Law School.
1 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
2 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
3 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1958).
4 Section 14(a) related only to state laws requiring employers to treat supervisors
as employees for purposes of collective bargaining, writing into the statute the pre-
emptive result of Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board supra
note 2; and § 14(b) related only to state laws prohibiting the execution and enforcement
of union security agreements, expressly freeing such laws from pre-emption.
5 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
6 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
7 IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
8 Even § 14(b) was found insufficient to preserve to the states the power to enjoin
picketing whose purpose was to obtain an exclusive hiring ball agreement in violation
of the state right to work law. Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Local 429, IBEW, 353
U.S. 969 (1957).
9 IAM Gonzales, supra note 7.
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faltering light"° revealing in many areas only the hazards that lie
ahead."
Congress, in developing legislation on internal union affairs, was
constantly reminded of the problem of pre-emption. Proposals to reg-
ulate unions with new laws were accompanied by efforts to fill the "no
man's land" produced by past laws.' 2 This served as a stern reminder
that faulty federal legislation intended to fill a need could create a
vacuum. Union spokesmen repeatedly declared that there existed a
substantial body of state law prohibiting union abuses and protecting
members rights.'3 At the same time, lAM v. Gonzales,14 challenging
the power of a state court to award damages to a member who had been
expelled for suing a union officer, was in the Supreme Court. This
dramatized the danger that provisions designed to protect members
might unwittingly destroy valuable remedies under state law.
The major proposals which served as a focus for debate in 1958
and 1959 reflected two different approaches to the problem. The Ken-
nedy-Ives Bill' 5 sought to tailor pre-emption to the particular subject
regulated, and to coordinate federal and state remedies to create a
comprehensive whole. Thus, the reporting title contained a clause
10 The full import of United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954), was uncertain for five years. Some clarity was provided by UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), which in turn created its own cloud of confusion. Only
with San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), were these cases
fully illuminated and revealed as involving simply state regulation of violence and public
order-light which at least four members of the court apparently had not previously
seen. The manifold implications of the pre-emption cases have been comprehensively
explored in Meltzer, "The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations," 59 Colum. L. Rev. 6 (1959).
11 The Garmon case, supra note 10, has brought to the fore as a crucial element
in pre-emption the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB to determine what activity is
protected or prohibited. This may cast the pre-emption problem in a new perspective
with unanticipated results. See Wellington, "Labor And The Federal System," 26 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 542 (1959).
12 See, e.g., S. 3099, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9 (1958) (Administration Bill) ; S. 3974,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 602 (1958) (Kennedy-Ives Bill); S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 601 (1959) (Kennedy-Ervin Bill) ; S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1959) (Senate
Committee Bill).
13 Statement of George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, "Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate,"
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1958) (hereafter cited as Senate Hearings [1958]); Statement
of George M. Harrison, Grand President of the Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks, id. at 1189; Statement of A. J. Hayes, President of the International Association
of Machinists, "Hearings Before the Committee on Education and 'Labor, House of
Representatives," 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1392-95 (1959) (hereafter cited as House Hearings
[1959]).
14 Supra note 7.
15 S. 3974, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958).
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barring states from requiring unions to file duplicating reports, but
requiring the Secretary of Labor to supply states with free copies. 6
The trusteeship title expressly preserved state remedies, but sought to
avoid a clash of federal and state remedies by providing "That upon
the filing of a complaint by the Secretary the jurisdiction of the district
court over such trusteeship shall be exclusive and the final judgment
shall be res adjudicata."' 7 The election article avoided a clash by ex-
pressly pre-empting state law in the election area with the provision,
"The duties imposed and the rights and remedies provided in this Act
shall be exclusive."'
In sharp contrast, the Administration Bill 9 made no attempt to
define the relative roles of state and federal law, but was designed only
to avoid weakening any possible protections under state law. The
fiduciary section had an all-inclusive savings clause stating that
"Nothing in this section shall reduce or limit the duties of responsibil-
ities of any officer.., of a labor organization under... the law of any
state ... ,,2o In addition, a general savings clause provided that nothing
in the title "shall be construed to supersede or modify any existing
rights and remedies of a union member under the law of any state."'"
The extent to which state law should be pre-empted became a
significant, though subsidiary, issue in the eighteen months of debate
leading up to the passage of the Labor Reform Act. The unions from
the outset vigorously urged that any federal law should displace state
law, and that unions ought not be subjected to dual sanctions.2 The
broad savings clause in the Administration Bill was termed its "most
offensive provision" by Arthur Goldberg, special counsel for the AFL-
CIO;23 and President George Meany declared that a similar clause
"reflects simply a diffused bias against unions and in favor of states
rights.' 24 Others, however, warned of the dangers inchoate in dis-
'G S. 3974, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(c) (1958).
17 S. 3974, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1958).
18 S. 3974, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1958).
19 S. 3097, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958).
20 S. 3097, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 204 (1958).
21 S. 3097, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 402 (1958). Other bills had equally board provi-
sions saving state law. See S. 3068, 85 Cong., 2nd Sess. §§ 407(d), 408(b) (1958)
(Senator Knowland).
22 Statement of George M. Harrison, Senate Hearings (1958), supra note 13, at
1189; Statement of A. J. Hayes, Senate Hearings (1958), supra note 13, at 1395; State-
ment of Andrew J. Biemiller, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO, "Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Labor of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate,"
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1959) (hereafter cited as Senate Hearings [1959]).
23 Senate Hearings (1959), supra note 22, at 580.
24 House Hearings (1959), supra note 13, at 1496. This statement was with reference
to the broad savings clause which is now § 603(a) of the act. For other statements of
similar tenor concerning other savings clauses now in the act, see pp. 1493, 1565.
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placing state remedies with limited federal legislation. 25 For example,
when the Kennedy-Ives Bill passed the Senate in 1958 with a provision
making federal remedies exclusive in union elections, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) pointed out that this would bar exist-
ing state remedies to correct misconduct prior to an election, without
providing any equivalent federal remedies. It might also pre-empt
states in related areas such as enjoining expulsion of a member for
distribution of campaign pamphlets or removal of local officers by
the international without a hearing.26 Professor Cox underscored this
danger and urged a narrower pre-emption clause.
Congressional fear of destroying valuable state remedies without
providing adequate federal substitutes, and the spectre of creating a
new "no man's land," routed all objections toward overlapping and
possibly conflicting remedies. The statute became studded with as-
sorted provisions cut from different patterns. The trusteeship and
elections titles each contained specially tailored provisions derived from
the Kennedy proposals; 2 8 the reporting title retained its specific pre-
emption of state reporting requirements; 29 but the Bill of Rights
broadly declared that nothing in it should "limit the rights and reme-
dies" of any union member "under any State or Federal law."30 The
dominant congressional mood, however, was expressed in section
603(a), which was applicable to all titles:
Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this
Act shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organiza-
tion or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of
a labor organization, or of any trust in which a labor organization
is interested, under any other Federal law or under the laws of any
State, and, except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in
this Act shall take away any right or bar any remedy to which mem-
bers of a labor organization are entitled under such other Federal
law or law of any State.
These provisions are unique in federal legislation. They attempt
to deal explicitly with the problem of pre-emption, but more impor-
tantly they contemplate the coexistence of federal and state law ap-
plicable to the same subject. This inevitably presents serious problems
25 Statement of Professor Clyde W. Summers, Senate Hearings (1958), sulpra note
13, at 606, 609, 612, 613.
26 ACLU Statement, July 13, 1958. Reprinted in "A Labor Union Bill of Rights,
Democracy In Labor Unions, The Kennedy-Ives Bill, Statements by ACLU," (Sept.
1958).
27 Senate Hearings (1959), supra note 22, at 113, 135-36.
28 See § 306 (trusteeship) ; § 403 (elections). The text of these provisions is quoted
in full as each is discussed in detail in the paper.
29 Section 205(c).
30 Section 103.
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of coordinating the two bodies of law and avoiding a clash of remedies.
The purpose here is not to discuss the wisdom of the congressional
choice, but only to explore what Congress has done. This may make
more clear the size and shape of the problems of coexistence and pro-
vide a better base for critical evaluation.
Each title of the act presents its own problems, not only because
the pre-emption provisions are different, but because the substantive
provisions and the cases which arise take quite different forms. There-
fore, the problems arising under each title must be examined sep-
arately, though in the context of the entire act. Few relevant cases
have yet been decided, nor can cases under other statutes provide any
substantial guide. We can only attempt to fit the statute to cases yet
unborn, and our analysis is limited by our ability to foresee their form.
TITLE I-BILL OF RIGHTS
When Senator McClellan presented his Bill of Rights on the
Senate floor, the problem of pre-emption became a central issue in the
debate. Senator Kennedy's major objection was that:
if the proposal were enacted, the present rather exhaustive remedies
under the common law of various states might be wiped out, and
only the rights suggested by the Senator from Arkansas would then
be available to union members.31
He repeatedly stressed that the states had provided "broad protection
for members," in some respects broader than the provisions in the Bill
of Rights,32 and that "we should make sure that we shall be better off
after the amendment is adopted than we are today."3 In response to
this argument, Senator Holland declared:
I am sure no Senator would want to take away from any labor
union member ... any rights or protections they have under the
laws of the State ....
Is it not true that a plenary provision guarding against pre-
emption, such as suggested by the Senator from Arkansas, would
completely guard against any such surrender of rights? Would it
not make clear that all rights-and the rights may vary in the dif-
ferent states-would be preserved. .... 34
Senator Kennedy then raised the question, "which would govern,
the Federal or the State law?" To this Senator Holland's answer was
simple and unequivocal, "I would say that both rights would prevail,
31 105 Cong. Rec. 5816 (daily ed. April 22, 1959).
32 105 Cong. Rec. 5817-21 (daily ed. April 22, 1959).
33 105 Cong. Rec. 5817 (daily ed. April 22, 1959).
34 Ibid.
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that both courts would be available, and both remedies would be avail-
able."35
As a result of this discussion, Senator McClellan added to his
amendment such a "plenary provision guarding against pre-emption,"
identical with present section 603 (a) .36 Later, when the Kuchel version
of the Bill of Rights was substituted, it included section 103, which un-
changed, provides:
Nothing contained in this title shall limit the rights and reme-
dies of any member of a labor organization under any State or
Federal law or before any court or other tribunal or under the con-
stitution and by-laws of any labor organization.
This provision was the product of three dominant themes which
ran through the debate on title I. First, Congress was concerned with
the rights of the union member within his union. It sought to increase
his rights and add to their protection from union restraint; it did not
seek to increase rights in the union against its members. The statutory
language itself speaks for member's rights: "Every member ... shall
have equal rights .. ." ; "Every member.., shall have the right to
meet and assemble freely ... " ;38 and no union "shall limit the right of
any member thereof to institute an action....,3 Section 103, in saving
state law, carries this same unilateral thrust. It does not purport to
save all state law. It seeks to guard the rights and remedies of union
members, but it does not preserve their duties and liabilities. Congress
sought to give union members the maximum protection available under
state and federal law.
Second, Congress did not conceive of this title, nor the statute as
a whole, as a comprehensive code defining the rights of union members.
Rather, it sought to establish certain basic rights as a minimum stand-
ard of decency guaranteed by the federal government. In response to
a question by Senator Butler, both Senator Kennedy and Senator
Kuchel emphatically denied that by enumerating certain rights others
35 Ibid.
36 105 Cong. Rec. 5822 (daily ed. April 22, 1959). This was added without objection,
even though its applicability was not limited to title I, but reached the whole act. Dur-
ing the debate on this title no one except Senator Kennedy raised questions about or
argued against dual rights and remedies. Senator Kennedy also expressed concern that
this savings clause "would upset the carefully prepared provisions in regard to secret
elections and trusteeships, as those provisions now appear in the bill." 105 Cong. Rec.
5826 (daily ed. April 22, 1959). No explanation of the basis for this concern was given.
37 Section 101(a) (1).
38 Section 101(a)(2).
39 Section 101(a)(3). Each of the sections contain provisos permitting unions to
qualify these rights. These provisos, however, are not worded to create duties in the
members but only to limit the reach of federally protected rights.
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were excluded or in any way abridged." The last clause of section 103,
preserving all of the members' rights under the union's constitution,
was added to make doubly clear that the declaring of a federal min-
imum did not impliedly bar the states from giving union members
added or different protection. 4
1
Third, Congress deliberately rejected secondary considerations
which weigh in favor of pre-emption. Senator Kennedy pointed out
that the savings clause would create dual remedies in federal and state
courts,42 but those supporting the Bill of Rights saw two available rem-
edies as better than one, permitting the aggrieved member's shopping
for the most favorable forum as a part of maximum protection. Senator
Morse later decried the lack of uniformity which would result,43 but
this was openly admitted and accepted as inherent in establishing a
federal minimum. 44
The critical objection, made by Senator Kennedy and others, that
the coexistence of two bodies of law would create conflicts, was never
squarely faced. The objections, made in the general terms, never
pointed out specific instances which would arise but seemed to express
fears of the unknown. Those advocating the broad savings clause ap-
parently felt either that the dual protections would not in fact conflict,
or that the courts could resolve the problems as they arose. It is to
this potentiality of conflict which we must now turn.45
The dominant themes of congressional intent by their very nature
prevent any conflict between federal and state law in most cases, for
the union can quite readily recognize individual rights under both. A
Negro who is relegated to an auxiliary local may have no right under
state law to attend and vote at union meetings, but he has a right under
the equal rights clause of the statute to full and equal participation.
No conflict exists, for the union's power under state law to discriminate
is not preserved by section 103 and the .federal right prevails. A mem-
ber expelled by a majority vote when the union constitution requires a
40 105 Cong. Rec. 6023-24 (daily ed. April 22, 1959).
41 105 Cong. Rec. 6024, 6025-26 (daily ed. April 22, 1959).
42 105 Cong. Rec. 5816, at 5818 (daily ed. April 22, 1959).
43 105 Cong. Rec. 16386 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959). This was part of his sweeping
attack on the conference bill.
44 Supra note 33.
45 If title I had been cast in terms of prohibitions imposed on unions, enforceable
by criminal sanctions, the problem of conflict would have appeared much simpler. Dual
criminal prohibitions are commonplace, and both must be obeyed, even though one is
more restrictive than the other. Conflict arises only if one affirmatively commands that
which the other prohibits. In such cases it is clear that the state cannot punish that
which is required by federal law. Title I, though cast in terms of individual rights, fixes
a minimum standard of conduct for unions and operates much as a prohibition on unions.
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two-thirds vote may have a state cause of action, but no federal cause
of action; and if his expulsion is for criticizing the officers, he may have
a cause of action under both laws. The federal and state rights coexist,
and either or both can be enforced without conflict. Congress clearly
intended that one should have dual remedies so as to provide maximum
protection.4
6
Conflict could arise if Congress at any particular point manifested
a specific intent to protect affirmatively the union's freedom of action
against its members. Conceivably, the various provisos might be so
construed. For example, section 101(a) (4) protecting the right to sue
provides that "any such member may be required to exhaust reason-
able hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four month lapse of time)
within such labor organization." It might be argued that Congress
intended to protect union procedures for self-correction and that for a
state to intervene without requiring such exhaustion would conflict with
this congressional intent.4 Similarly, it might be argued that for a
state to protect freedom of speech beyond the limitations expressed in
the proviso in section 101(a) (2) would violate a national policy of
permitting unions this degree of internal discipline. So construed, these
provisos would limit rights under state law. The legislative history of
title I, however, shows no congressional concern beyond limiting the
range of federal protection of the basic rights, and the explicit words
of section 103 militate strongly against such a construction.
Because title I is cast in terms of rights of members rather than
prohibitions on unions, conflict may arise if one member claims rights
under state law and another member claims competing rights under
federal law. Thus, one member might claim that under the union con-
stitution, enforced by state law, his dues could not be increased except
by a two-thirds vote of his elected officers and not by a plebiscite. An-
other member could claim that under section 101 (a) (3) his dues could
be increased only by a membership vote. Both assert individual rights to
a democratic process, but the claims clash and the courts must resolve
the conflict. The constitutional provision could be treated as void under
section 101(b), and thereby eliminate the source of the state right.
Although logically neat, the effect is to use this section to destroy ex-
isting rights under state law contrary to section 103. The alternative is
to require that both processes be followed; in other words, that the
46 Some of the procedural problems raised by the availability of dual rights and
remedies are discussed infra.
47 Senator Kennedy, in explaining the conference bill, made clear that this proviso
did not invalidate state court decisions which did not require exhaustion of internal
remedies because of circumstances of the case. 105 Cong. Rec. 16415 (daily ed. Sept. 3,
1959).
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dues increase be voted by the executive board and ratified by refer-
endum. The individual might claim, however, that the combined process
which divides responsibility is actually a third process which destroys
his right to responsible executive board control. Regardless of section
103, that right no longer exists for the statute has required otherwise.
In choosing between available alternatives, the courts must not look
to verbal logic but to the practical consequences of their choice. To
preserve the union's procedure saves the maximum of state rights with
a minimum of disruption. If the union dislikes divided responsibility,
it can amend its constitution.
In some cases the clash of competing individual rights may be
even sharper. For example, a statement made by one union member
against another may be defamatory under state law but fair comment
under the free speech section of the federal law. The aggrieved member
may file charges under the discipline clause prohibiting slandering a
union member and argue that section 103 saves his rights under the
union constitution not to be slandered. At the same time the accused
can insist on his rights under section 101(a) (2) to make these state-
ments. This conflict might be submerged by reading section 103 as
preserving only a member's rights against the union and not his rights
against other members, but if the aggrieved sues the union for failing
to take disciplinary action, further word whittling will be required.4 8
The conflict might again be neatly resolved by reading section 101 (b)
as invalidating the discipline clause to the extent that it encroached on
the right of free speech; but again this is but a disguised way of limit-
ing existing state rights contrary to section 103.
The underlying difficulty is Congress's simplistic conception of
individual rights as running only against the union and not against
other members. This creates the conflict, and it can best be resolved by
recognizing that section 103 cannot in such cases carry its full literal
meaning. The individual rights provided in the federal law must be
fully protected, and other individual rights under state law must be
adjusted or even curtailed to the extent necessary to achieve that pro-
tection.
Such instances of conflict, though possible, will seldom occur in
practical operation, and title I with its anti-pre-emption provision will
48 There is an additional question whether the defendant in a state defamation
action can claim that this statement was federally protected as fair comment under § 101
(a) (2). Section 103 is not applicable, for it was intended to protect only rights which
related to union membership, and the right against defamation is independent of mem-
bership. The court must adjust the competing state and federal interests, and although
there is no direct conflict of legal commands, it would seem inappropriate that a federal
definition of the bounds of free speech in an area where national interest predominates
should be ignored by states in defamation actions.
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create relatively few problems of coordinating federal and state law.
Congress, while not dealing explicitly with the problems, made its pre-
vailing purpose sufficiently clear to give the courts adequate guides for
performing their traditional function of resolving potential conflict or
divergence between the two bodies of law.
TITLE II-REPORTING
In sharp contrast to the broad savings clause in title I and the
predominant policy of permitting concurrent state regulation, section
205(c) pre-empts the state from requiring any person to furnish any
information included in a federal report.49 The wording and meaning
of this provision is as puzzling as its parentage is obscure.
The Kennedy-Ives Bill in 1958 contained a provision requiring the
Secretary of Labor to make available to state officers copies of reports
filed by unions or employers under the reporting requirements.9 When
Senator Kennedy submitted his revised bill in January, 1959, there had
been added the following:
No person shall be required by reason of any law of any State to
furnish to any officer or agency of such State any information in-
cluded in a report filed by such person with the Secretary pursuant
to provisions of this title if a copy of such report, or a portion
thereof, is furnished to such officer or agencyfr
No explanation was ever given of the purpose of this provision, and it
was completely overlooked throughout the legislative debates. 2
Presumably, its purpose was to protect unions from being bur-
dened with multiple reporting requirements. That burden would be
particularly onerous if the reports required varied from state to state.
49 "The Secretary shall make available without payment of a charge, or require
any person to furnish to such State agency as is designated by law or by the Governor
of the State in which such person has his principal place of business or headquarters,
upon request of the Governor of such State, copies of any reports and documents filed
by such person with the Secretary pursuant to section 201, 202, or 203, or of information
and data contained therein. No person shall be required by reason of any law of any
State to furnish to any officer or agency of such State any information included in a
report filed by such person with the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of this title,
if a copy of such report, or of the portion thereof containing such information, is
furnished to such officer or agency."
50 S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(c) (1958). This provision was substantially
the same as the first sentence in the present provision quoted supra note 49.
51 S. 505, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(c) (1959).
52 The section-by-section analysis accompanying the bill merely paraphrased the
section. 105 Cong. Rec. 817 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1959). The Senate Committee Report did
not mention this change, and in its section-by-section analysis again paraphrased it.
S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The same was true of the House Com-
mittee Report. H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The trusteeship title
requiring reports, incorporates by reference all of § 205(c). See § 301(b).
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One report should be enough, and the state's interest in obtaining the
information could be satisfied by furnishing a copy of that report. If
this was the commonly understood purpose, it could explain the total
lack of legislative discussion.
Unfortunately, the words are ill-designed to achieve that end for
they say both too much and too little. First, they bar more than state
reporting laws; they bar a state from requiring any person to "furnish
to any officer or agency of such State any information included in a
report." For example, in Bell v. Waterfront Commission a subpoena
was resisted on the grounds that the information sought by the state
agency had been included in a report filed under title II; and the state
was pre-empted by the explicit words of section 205(c). Compelled to
override these words, the court used section 603 (a) and the predom-
inant statutory policy against pre-emption. This, however, gives no
guide as to what, if anything, is left within section 205(c).-" Judicial
declarations that the section "implies that state agencies may continue
to keep themselves informed as to matters in the scope of the federal
statute,"5i5 leap-frog the troublesome words, and statements such as
"when Congress wanted to displace state law it knew how to do so,""5
provide less light than humor.
On the other hand, the words of section 205(c) do not prohibit
states from requiring different reports; indeed, this is the only kind
which the words permit. The state cannot require "information in-
cluded" in the federal report, but it is not barred from requiring addi-
tional or more detailed information, or even a breakdown in different
categories. Each of the fifty states could require reports as long as they
were careful not to duplicate the federal report. The words on their
face contradict the presumed purpose of protecting unions from the
burden of multiple and varied reports.
New York has sought to deal with this gremlin clause by inverting
53 183 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
54 The application of § 205(c) may be limited by § 604, which provides: "Nothing
in this Act shall be construed to impair or diminish the authority of any State to enact
and enforce general criminal laws with respect to robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzle-
ment, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, assault
with intent to kill, or assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury, or conspiracy to
commit any of such crimes." This would seem to override even an explicit pre-emption
clause such as § 205(c). The crimes listed, however, are probably exclusive, for the
intention was to carefully limit this clause to prevent states from overriding pre-emption
by enacting criminal statutes. 105 Cong. Rec. 5991 (daily ed. April 24, 1959).
55 Bell v. Waterfront Commission, 279 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1960) (opinion granting
motion to stay pending appeal).
66 Ibid. On appeal, the subpoena was upheld, but this particular point was never
mentioned. 279 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1960).
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its words. The New York Fiduciary and Reporting statute,5 adopted
just prior to the federal act, provides that the Industrial Commissioner
shall accept in lieu of the state report a duplicate copy of the federal
report if it contains substantially equivalent information and is verified
by the officers.58 The purpose of this provision was to avoid burdening
unions with different reports, but at the same time to enable the state
to investigate the accuracy of the reports and prosecute wilfull falsifica-
tion."9 After the federal act was passed, the state reporting forms were
modified to conform substantially with the new federal forms. The
Industrial Commissioner, with reasoning similar to that used by the
court in Bell v. Waterfront Commission, took the position that section
205 (c) does not pre-empt the states from requiring parallel reports and
making false reporting a state offense.6" This sensibly accommodates
the national interest in protecting unions against undue accounting
burdens with the state interest in discovering and prosecuting misuse
of union funds or violations of fiduciary obligations, but it scarcely
fits the words of the section.0 '
The courts are confronted with a provision so obviously mis-
drafted that if applied according to its terms, it will defeat both federal
and state interests and serve no positive values. The courts have an
obligation to reconstruct the section to achieve its presumed purpose
and to work out the practical adjustment required by the federal sys-
tem. The balance of interests made by New York provides an appro-
priate starting point 2
Union members who seek to inspect the union's books and records
may have both state and federal remedies. Under section 201(c) the
federal right is limited to examining records "necessary to verify"
reports filed under the statute. The state right may not be so circum-
57 New York Labor And Management Improper Practices Act, N.Y. Labor Laws,
Art. 20A, §§ 720-732.
58 Section 726(5).
59 Interim Report, Governor's Committee on Improper Labor And Management
Practices, at 21-22 (1958).
60 Labor And Management Improper Practices Act, New York State Industrial
Commissioner, Opinion No. 1 (Nov. 11, 1959).
61 The forms required under the Connecticut Union Reporting Act, passed prior
to the statute, vary from the federal form. This has caused some difficulties, for union
members finding differences in the amounts reported on the state and federal forms be-
come suspicious that their officers are juggling the books when they are only trying to
comply with diverse requirements. However, Connecticut confusion would seem to fit
the words of § 205(c) better than the New York accommodation.
62 It still leaves, however, difficult questions as to the amount of deviation from
federal reports that will be permissible without being deemed an undue burden. Cer-
tainly, the state should not be obstructed in discovering misuse of union funds at local
levels and punishing officers who deceive their members with false reports.
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scribed, but this creates no conflict between federal and state law. 3
The limited federal right is a federal minimum fitted to the reporting
requirements and does not carry an implication that unions should be
protected from additional burdens; section 603(a) plainly preserves
the state right.
TITLE III-TRuSTEESHIPS
The statute contemplates three possible remedies in trusteeship
cases. First, a local union or its members may sue in the state courts
under state law; second, they may sue in the federal courts under fed-
eral law; and third, they may file a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor who, if he finds probable cause that a violation has occurred,
shall bring an action in the federal district court. 4 The only provision
coordinating these three remedies, is section 306, which provides:
The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addi-
tion to any and all other rights and remedies at law or in equity:
Provided, that upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary thejurisdiction of the district court shall be exclusive and the finaljudgment shall be res judicata.
The central thrust of title III is similar to that of title I, except
that here Congress sought to protect both the local and its members
from the international union. Congress was concerned with the abusive
use of trusteeships and sought to give increased rights and remedies
against that device. Protection under existing law was deemed inade-
quate,"3 and federal law was needed "to place limits on the reasons for
which trusteeships can be imposed and the period for which they may
be continued." 66
Congressional intent to preserve state remedies is evident in the
first clause of section 306, but unlike section 103, it does not carry on
its face the unilateral thrust of saving only the rights of the local and
its members against the international. 7 It purports to preserve "all
63 The rights may vary in other respects, but the court can decide whether the
member has a right to inspect under either state or federal law. See Henderson v. Sarle,
197 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
64 Section 304(a).
65 Protection under existing law was deemed inadequate for three reasons: (1)
courts inquired only into the fairness of the procedure and not into the substantive
grounds for imposing the trusteeship, (2) members were often intimidated from chal-
lenging trusteeships for fear of disciplinary reprisals, and (3) members commonly lack the
financial resources to challenge trusteeships in the courts.
66 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1959).
67 The purpose of this sentence in § 306 was stated in the report of the House
Committee which gave the section its final form:
"Enactment of the bill will not affect the right of a local union or its members to
challenge a trusteeship in the State courts. Section 306 explicitly preserves existing rights
and remedies except that the final judgment in any suit brought by the Secretary of
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other rights and remedies"-a literal impossibility. For example, an
international union which has imposed a trusteeship may bring suit to
compel the local to turn over all assets and possession of the union hall.
The international may have such rights under applicable state law,
but if the trusteeship violates the federal standards, those state rights
must fall. The clumsily worded anti-pre-emption clause here must be
read like section 102 as saving the rights of the local and its members.
It manifests an intent not to occupy the field or preclude state law by
implication, but it can not save rights which conflict with those affirm-
atively protected by the statute.
The same types of problems raised by title I are potential here.
First, did Congress at any point contradict its underlying premise of
establishing only minimum protection against trusteeship and manifest
an intent to protect affirmatively the union's freedom? Committee re-
ports reflect a sensitive awareness that the line between proper and
improper trusteeships must be carefully drawn, and that it would "un-
reasonably impair the independence of labor unions to allow much
scope at this point for government to review the judgment of union
officials.168 Title III has many earmarks of a comprehensive code, and
there is some incongruity in allowing states to impose different and
potentially more restrictive standards.0 9 Section 306, however, clearly
bars any general pre-emption, and there is no basis in legislative his-
tory to give any particular provision special pre-emptive effect.
Second, the rights sought to be protected, those of the local and
its members, may compete or clash. If a local union is torn by bitter
factionalism, some members may claim a right under the constitution
Labor will bind both the union and the members. Individual union members will there-
fore have a choice between suing in the State courts under the common law or in-
voking the provisions of the federal statute." H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
15 (1959).
68 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19 (1959).
69 Contrary to the apparent assumption of the congressional committees, state court
decisions give greater protection in at least one respect. State courts have regularly upset
trusteeships for failure to comply with procedural requirements of the constitution or
lack of a fair trial. See Fanara v. Teamsters, 128 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1954);
Garcia v. Ernst, 101 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1950); United Bhd. v. Carpenters Local
14, 178 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). The procedural defect may actually be a
disguise for upsetting the trusteeship on substantive grounds. See Schrank v. Brown,
192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct. 1948); 192 Misc. 603, 81 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup.
Ct. 1948); 194 Misc. 138, 86 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1949). The federal statute,
§ 304(c), does not require conformity with the procedural provisions of the union con-
stitution, or even any hearing at all. Such procedural defects merely deprive the inter-
national of the benefit of a presumption of validity and apparently do not create the
adverse presumption of invalidity.
There is at present no effective state legislation limiting trusteeships, but such legisla-
tion, if passed, might well be far more restrictive than the federal statute.
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to have a trusteeship established to save the local and re-establish
orderly democracy; but others may claim a right under federal law to
local autonomy and unobstructed democratic process. Resolution of
this clash, as in title I, requires frank recognition that in spite of the
unqualified words of section 306, federal law is supreme, and when
such a clash occurs state law must fall.
The unique element in title III is the second clause of section 306
providing that upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary, the
jurisdiction of the district court shall be exclusive and the final judg-
ment shall be res adjudicata. Under this provision, a state court (or
federal court) may be suddenly shorn of its jurisdiction in mid-process,
for the filing of the Secretary's complaint invokes pre-emption as
against state law, and primary jurisdiction as against private suits in
state courts.
This novel displacement in mid-process raises a number of ques-
tions, probably more perplexing conceptually than practically. If the
displaced court has issued a temporary injunction, or even a per-
manent injunction which has not become a final judgment, this injunc-
tion would be dissolved by the Secretary's action. The Secretary, how-
ever, could seek to prevent denuding a local of existing judicial pro-
tection by requesting a temporary injunction preserving the status quo
pending the determination of the suit.70 The danger of displacement is
that in some circumstances state law may give greater protection to
the local than federal law,7 and those in fact supporting the trustee-
ship might file a complaint with the Secretary in hopes of using him as
an unwitting pawn to escape state remedies. The simple answer is that
the local and its members are entitled to the highest level of protection
available, so that as long as state courts are giving adequate protec-
tion, the Secretary need not and should not intervene. If the state
remedy ultimately fails, he can then find that "the violation has not
been remedied" and proceed. The Secretary's function is not to vin-
dicate a public right but to sue on behalf of the local and its members
to relieve them of the financial costs and dangers of reprisals.
72
If the private suit is based on federal law, either in the federal or
state courts, 73 the Secretary's protective role is somewhat different.
Final judgment on the statutory cause of action would seem to be res
70 Section 304(a) authorizes the Secretary to seek "such relief (including injunctions)
as may be appropriate." This was clearly intended to make available temporary in-
junctions if necessary. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
71 See supra note 69.
72 See Statement by Professor Cox, Senate Hearings (1959), supra note 22, at 132.
73 For discussion of the question whether federal rights can be enforced in state
courts, see infra.
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adjudicata as against the Secretary as much as against the local and
its members for whose benefit he acts. 74 If members who are dissatis-
fied with the way the private action is being prosecuted file a complaint,
with the Secretary, he might properly displace the private action if he
believed it necessary to insure that the members obtained full protec-
tion of their federal rights.75
The provision making final judgment in the Secretary's action res
adjudicata presents bothersome ambiguities. Its purpose was twofold:
one, to make clear that the Secretary's action would bind both the
union and its members; 76 and two, to foreclose subsequent private
suits under state law which might be more favorable.77 Ambiguities
arise because the trusteeship title regulates at two levels. It not only
limits the purpose for which trusteeships can be established and main-
tained, but it also prohibits certain conduct during a concededly valid
trusteeship. 78 Thus, the Secretary may not only sue to dissolve the
trusteeship, but may sue to prevent the international union from count-
ing the votes of delegates who have not been elected by the local, or
prevent the transfer of local assets to the international.79 Section 306
fails to distinguish between these two types of suit, but boldly says
that when a complaint is filed jurisdiction becomes exclusive "over such
trusteeship." Literally applied, a suit by the Secretary to enjoin the
transfer of funds would permanently block private suits to challenge
the trusteeship; and the Secretary's testing of the trusteeship would
foreclose private actions to protect the local's funds. This would require
the Secretary, if he filed a complaint of any kind, to assume full re-
sponsibility for testing the validity of the trusteeship and monitoring
its administration. Such results can be avoided and the purposes of the
provision fulfilled by limiting the pre-emptive effect of the Secretary's
action to the type of violation alleged in his complaint; and making
74 Trusteeship cases, by their nature, raise prickly problems of class actions and the
effect of such actions to bind all members of the class. These nettles are left for nimbler
fingers. The limited point here is that if final judgment is binding on the local and all
of its members, its ties cannot be loosened by the Secretary.
75 He might fear that the plaintiffs could not finance necessary investigation, litiga-
tion costs, or ultimate appeals, or he might even sense haf-heartedness or suspect col-
lusion.
76 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959).
77 Private suits in trusteeship cases brought in the federal courts on federal rights
would not be res judicata as to subsequent suits brought in state courts on state
rights, unless the state right is enforceable in the federal court and therefore could be
raised in the first suit.
78 Section 303.
79 Section 303 contains criminal sanctions, but § 304 contemplates enforcement also
through a suit by the Secretary. Only violations of the reporting requirements are not
enforceable through this procedure.
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res judicata no broader against private suits than it would be against
the Secretary himself.
TITLE IV-ELECTIONS
The relationship of federal and state remedies in union elections is
totally different from that in other areas, for title IV proceeds from
opposite premises. In direct contrast to titles I and III, which permit
each state to superimpose its rights and remedies on a federally guar-
anteed minimum, title IV constitutes a comprehensive code which is
to provide a single uniform body of law. Congressional purpose was
made plain in the Senate Committee Report:
There is a great need for uniformity in the laws governing
union elections. International and national unions operate in many
States. It would be confusing, unduly burdensome, and often impos-
sible for them to comply with a variety of election laws. The same
considerations apply, with somewhat lesser force, to local unions, a
considerable number of which function in several States. Also, the
burden of checking compliance will fall upon the international un-
ion. It is easier to enforce one uniform rule than a crazy quilt of
State legislation and court decisions. Ill-considered State laws
would interfere with the national labor policy. Too stringent laws
would handicap unions in dealing with employers. Too frequent
elections may keep a union in a state of turmoil and could result in
instability in collective bargaining relationships with employers.80
The purpose was uniformity to be achieved by supplanting state
substantive law with a complete body of federal law. The substantive
rules governing elections have two distinct sources under section 401
-statutory standards, and the union constitution. Section 401 pre-
scribes a web of specific rules designed to guarantee fair and demo-
cratic elections. It also requires that "The election shall be conducted
in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of such organization
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this title."'18
Section 402(a), in providing for enforcement, recognizes these two
sources of substantive law.82
The entire body of law drawn from these two sources is federal
law, imposed by the federal statute and enforced in the forums des-
ignated by the statute. The first sentence of section 403 makes this
body of federal substantive law exclusive:
80 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1959).
81 Section 401(c).
82 The section provides that "A member of a labor organization . . .may file a
complaint with the Secretary ... alleging the violating of any provision of Section 401
(including violation of the constitution and by-laws of the labor organization pertaining
to the election and removal of officers)."
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No labor organization shall be required by law to conduct
elections of officers with greater frequency or in a different form or
manner than is required by its own constitution or by-laws, except
as otherwise provided by this title.83
State substantive law is pre-empted; the single uniform body of law
is that imposed by the statute.
The picture is blurred by the awkward wording of the second
sentence of section 403, for it seems to contradict the first sentence by
preserving "Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution
and by-laws of a labor organization with respect to elections prior to
the conduct thereof." Confusion is added by the third sentence which
reasserts the principle of uniformity, "The remedy provided by this
statute for challenging an election already conducted shall be exclu-
sive." Standing alone, these might be read as allowing states to apply
their own substantive law, at least so far as their law enforced the
union constitution, in actions brought prior to the election, but pre-
empting state law after the election. This would lead to the anomalous
result that the applicable substantive law would depend on the date
the action was brought. The same conduct, such as restricting nomina-
tions, declaring candidates ineligible, or fixing the date and place of
election, would be governed by state law in pre-election suits and by
federal law in post-election proceedings.
Such a reading out of context which blunts the thrust for uni-
formity is not required by the legislative history, nor does it help ful-
fill the purpose for which the second sentence was included. As men-
tioned earlier, 4 the Kennedy-Ives Bill in 1958 provided only a post-
election review and barred all other rights and remedies. Objections to
this clause were based in principal part on the need for pre-election
remedies to correct or prevent violations before the election was held.
Upsetting an election was a poor substitute for obtaining a fair election
in the first instance. The ACLU and others pointed out that speedy
pre-election remedies were available in state courts and urged that this
remedy be preserved. The concern was not with substantive law but
available procedures; even the most comprehensive code would be in-
complete without this remedy to enforce it. 5
83 The remainder of the section is as follows:
"Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor or-
ganization with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by
the provisions of this title. The remedy provided by this title for challenging an election
already conducted shall be exclusive."
84 Supra p. 120.
85 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959). For the great importance
placed by Congress on providing for pre-election remedies, see 105 Cong. Rec. 6032 (daily
ed. April 25, 1959).
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The central purpose of the second sentence of section 403 was to
keep available prompt pre-election remedies, not to preserve state sub-
stantive law. 8 State courts were retained as a proper forum for suits
prior to the election. After the election, the exclusive procedure is a
suit in the federal district court brought by the Secretary. The election
does not work a change of substantive law, but a change of appropriate
forum. Before the election, speed is of the essence and the relief sought
is correction of specific defects; this is entrusted to the faster direct
suit in equity. After the election, correction is possible only by order-
ing a new and supervised election; this is entrusted to a slower and
more considered procedure of investigation and suit by the Secretary.
Section 403 can thus be interpreted to avoid internal contradiction
and fulfill the various purposes of its separate sentences. The first sen-
tence makes the federal law, drawn from the statutory prescriptions
and the union constitution, the exclusive body of substantive law. The
second and third sentences allocate the enforcement of that law to two
distinct remedies-one to prevent the violation before it is accom-
plished, and the other to redress the evil by holding a new election.
This understanding of section 403 gives guidance in solving the
most critical problem of the section-scope of pre-election remedies.
If a candidate is discfualified in violation of the union constitution, the
state court can order his name restored to the ballot; this is plain on
any reading of the second sentence. However, if he is declared ineligible
for non-payment of dues in full compliance with the constitution but
in violation of the check-off clause of section 401(c), the words of the
second sentence cause difficulty. It mentions only "existing rights and
remedies to enforce the constitution," and not remedies to enforce the
statute. The primary concern of the drafters, however, was to save the
already available pre-election remedy, and the only "existing" remedy
was to enforce the constitution. Mention only of this, under the cir-
cumstances, does not show an intent to bar pre-election remedies for
other violations of the statute. It would be strange, indeed, to find that
Congress intended that deviations from the union's constitution would
be subject to more effective sanctions than violations of congression-
ally created rights, and that those rights which were deemed so basic
as to be prescribed by statute were to be enforced only by a procedure
which Congress considered inadequate.
When a state court gives a pre-election remedy for violation of the
union constitution, it enforces federal substantive law. There is no
86 In describing the impact of § 403 in preserving access to state courts, Senator
Kennedy said, "Prior to the day of an election an individual can sue in a State. The
day after the election the Secretary assumes jurisdiction." 105 Cong. Rec. 5821 (daily
ed. April 22, 1959).
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reason why it should not enforce the full body of federal law regard-
less of the source.87 This conforms to the legislative history, fulfils the
congressional purpose, and fits the words of section 403. The last sen-
tence of the section points in the same direction.88 The only case in which
the statutory remedy is exclusive is in the challenging of an election
already conducted. In all other cases, the federal right may be en-
forced by whatever remedies are appropriate, which includes particu-
larly the pre-election remedies on which Congress heavily relied.89
Actions to compel the holding of an election, as contrasted with
actions to challenge an election, are caught in a crossfire of words and
intent as to what is the proper forum and procedure. An order to com-
pel an election is, in a dryly literal sense, a "remedy ... prior to the
conduct thereof." The second sentence of section 403, however, was
never intended to save such actions, but to save only remedies to
perfect a pending election. No one ever questioned the adequacy of
the statutory remedy in section 402 to compel the holding of an elec-
tion. The third sentence makes this statutory remedy exclusive for
"challenging an election already conducted," but this does not neces-
sarily imply an intent that the direct counterpart should not be ex-
clusive. Both the action to compel and the action to challenge an elec-
tion have common factors distinct from pre-election remedies. Both
cast doubts on the status of incumbent officers; both require the hold-
ing of an election with the union subjected to substantial cost and
87 During the debates, Senator Prouty raised the question what procedures were
available to enforce statutory requirements in elections, and rejected the setting aside of
the election as an adequate remedy. Senator Kennedy, in answering, declared, "If the
breach should occur prior to the date of the election, of course State remedies would
be available. If the breach should occur after the date of the election, the Secretary
would have power to set the election aside." 105 Cong. Rec. 5866 (daily ed. April 23,
1959).
88 If the third sentence is construed to mean that the only remedy to enforce statu-
tory rights is to challenge an election already conducted, it would contradict the clear
intent of § 402 providing for proceedings to compel the holding of an election or to
remove an officer.
89 Pre-election remedies would seem to be available in both state and federal courts.
It is true that the title contains no clause granting jurisdiction to the federal courts, but
this is not necessary, for the federal courts have general jurisdiction to enforce federal
rights and Congress did not expressly preclude them. A cloud is cast by the provision in
§ 401(c) expressly declaring that a candidate's right to have campaign literature and
to have equal access to mailing privileges and membership lists are enforceable in the
federal district courts. This was added during the Senate debate as a part of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. There was no evidence that this was added to give these
rights greater protection than other rights created by this title. 105 Cong. Rec. 6031-33
(daily ed. April 25, 1959). It would be strange to find that a candidate could have a
pre-election remedy to enforce his right to mail campaign literature, but no such remedy
to enforce his statutory right to be a candidate. The senators manifested considerable
confusion in this area, but they did not manifest a compelling desire for such whimsy.
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internal turmoil; and section 402 contemplates that the Secretary shall
supervise the election. All of these give the role of the Secretary as the
moving party special significance. The principle of primary jurisdic-
tion and the policies on which it rests argue for an interpretation that
any order requiring an election to be held must be based on the proce-
dures prescribed by section 402.1°
Spliced into title IV are vagrant provisions designed to insure that
local union officers be vulnerable to removal for serious misconduct.
If the local constitution lacks adequate procedures, they may be re-
moved after hearing by a vote of the members. A member may com-
plain to the Secretary either that the constitutional provisions have
been violated, or that they are not adequate. The Secretary can then
bring an action to compel compliance with the constitution, or if he
finds it inadequate, to require the union to follow the statutory proce-
dure. There is no need here to explore the unlighted labyrinths of these
provisions,9 1 for we are concerned only with the relative roles of state
and federal courts.
Section 403 seems to have no application to officer removal cases
since it deals only with elections, and the general savings clause of
section 603 (a) would seem to apply. A member who claimed violation
of the constitution could bring a private suit to enforce his "contract"
as well as file a complaint with the Secretary. A claim that the proce-
dure was inadequate, however, could be enforced only through the
Secretary, for he has primary jurisdiction of the threshold question of
adequacy.
The officer removal provisions create a conflict of rights since the
statute vests in the member a right to remove an officer; but the of-
ficer, too, is a member with both federal and state rights. Furthermore,
other members who elected him have a right that he be allowed to
serve. A local president removed by the executive board on charges of
misconduct may be ordered reinstated by a state court because the
board was biased or failed to prove his guilt. This right is saved for
him by section 603(a); however, if a member then files a complaint
with the Secretary who finds the procedure not adequate, the officer
can be retried and removed by a vote of the members. The fact that
this procedure did not comply with the constitution would not entitle
90 The sweeping language of § 603 (a) causes momentary pause, for it purports to
save all rights to which union members are entitled under any other federal law or law
of any state, "except as explicitly provided to the contrary." However, as it has been
pointed out, the first sentence of § 403 expressly pre-empts state law in election cases
and supplants it with federal law. There is no state law remaining on which § 603(a)
can operate.
91 See, e.g., the multitude of puzzling problems suggested by Senator Goldwater. 105
Cong. Rec. 9115 (daily ed. June 8, 1959).
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the officer to claim a violation of his "contract" in the state court. The
federal right must prevail, and even the adamant words of section
603(a) cannot save state rights which conflict.
TITLE V-SAFEGUARDS FOR LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
This title includes three areas which present problems of coor-
dinating state and federal law: fiduciary obligations of union officers; 92
bonding;9" and prohibitions against certain persons holding office. 4
Title V has no separate savings clause itself, but the general savings
clause of section 603 (a) is applicable.
A. Fiduciary Obligations of Union Officers
The debate on these provisions re-echoed many of the same themes
that ran through the debate on title I. Congress recognized that state
law imposed substantial fiduciary obligations on union officers, but
experience had proven state law standing alone to be inadequate.
Congress therefore sought to establish a federal minimum and to en-
force it with federal remedies without reducing any obligations im-
posed by state law. 5 Indeed, the very words of section 603 (a) orig-
inated as a savings clause incorporated in the fiduciary obligation pro-
vision added during the Senate debates, and the words "responsibil-
ities ...of any officer" were included in that clause for the very
purpose of preserving state fiduciary obligations.96
The fixing of a federal standard, therefore, carried no implication
that this was the maximum obligation with which union officers should
be burdened. The state is free to establish a higher standard and to
enforce it with more vigorous sanctions. For example, the New York
statute9 7 allows for prohibition of transactions not forbidden by fed-
eral law.98 It holds third persons liable who knowingly participate in
conflict of interest transactions,99 permits suit without leave of court,100
and imposes criminal penalties for wilfull violations,10 even though
these may go beyond the federal remedies. In short, the union officer
must measure up to both standards, subject to the sanctions of each or
both.
92 Section 501.
93 Section 502.
94 Section 504.
95 105 Cong. Rec. 5856-61 (daily ed. April 23, 1959).
96 105 Cong. Rec. 5860 (daily ed. April 23, 1959).
97 New York Labor And Management Improper Practices Act, supra note 57.
98 Id. §§ 722, 723. The New York statute is much more detailed and defines certain
transactions as constituting a conflict of interests.
99 Sections 724, 725-3.
100 Section 725-1.
301 Section 725-4.
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Federal and state law can create clashing obligations. For ex-
ample, in the sale of a union hall, the highest bidder may be a syn-
dicate in which a local officer has an interest. Under state law this may
not create a conflict of interest but rather impose a fiduciary obliga-
tion on the executive board to accept the highest bid. Under federal
law such a sale may be prohibited as constituting an unlawful conflict
of interest. The conflict must be resolved here as elsewhere by en-
forcing the federal obligation, even though it limits the state obligation
contrary to the plain words of section 603(a). If the situation is in-
verted, however, with the transaction prohibited by state law but per-
mitted by federal law, the state prohibition would seem to prevail.
Thus, if state law limited investment of union funds to legal securities,
union officers could not excuse other investments on the ground that
section 501 obligated them to benefit the members by making invest-
ments with greater return or in particular projects such as low cost
housing in which the members had a special interest. Congress mani-
fested no intent to impose on union officers an obligation to enter into
transactions prohibited by state law, but rather sought to increase the
safety of union funds and reduce the risks of conflicts of interest.
State law imposing fiduciary obligations may be pre-empted by
other federal law, for section 603 (a) protects against pre-emption only
under "this act." For example, if a union officer received a bribe for
signing a collective agreement, state law might allow rescission; how-
ever under the Lincoln Mills"2 doctrine, the validity of the collective
agreement is governed by federal law and state law is pre-empted.
Similarly, state law restricting the use of union funds for secondary
boycott or organizational picketing would seem to be pre-empted as a
state regulation of concerted activities. 3
B. Bonding
Section 502 requiring bonding of union officers was not intended
to establish a federal minimum to undergird state law. It represents
the considered weighing of the need to protect union funds and the
need to avoid undue burdens on unions. Standing alone, it would carry
102 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln MIis of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
103 Compare San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 10.
More difficult problems would arise if the state narrowly restricted the use of union
funds for political purposes. It would seem not to be pre-empted by § 304 of Taft-
Hartley amending the Corrupt Practices Act, for it reaches only contributions or ex-
penditures in connection with a federal election. However, if the political expenditure
"relates . . . to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining," or is
"germane to collective bargaining," Railway Employees Department, AFL v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 255 (1956), it might be argued that the state could not thus impair the union's
effectiveness as a statutory bargaining agent.
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the implication that additional burdens were not to be imposed, and
that states were precluded from superimposing their own bonding re-
quirements. The words of section 603(a), however, seem to bar such
pre-emption. There is serious doubt whether separate state bonding
was one of the "responsibilities of labor organizations" that Congress
intended to preserve, but the emphatic words of the section are dif-
ficult to escape without the aid of explicit words, or a conflict between
state and federal obligations which makes it impossible to fulfill both.
State bonding requirements might possibly be attacked as bur-
dening and obstructing unions in exercising their rights under the
NLRA. To sustain such an attack, the state requirement would have
to be shown to be vindictive or onerous out of all proportion to any
state interest.
C. Prohibition Against Certain Persons Holding Office
The fact that Congress in section 504 has limited the right of
former communists and felons to hold union office does not preclude
states from imposing stricter limitations on such persons. In DeVeall
v. Braisted,104 a man who thirty years before had pleaded guilty to
attempted grand larceny was disqualified from holding union office
under the New York Waterfront Commission Act. Although the state
law disqualified one for crimes not listed in section 504 and the dis-
qualification was not limited to five years, the Supreme Court held that
the state law was not pre-empted by the federal statute. It buttressed
its conclusion with these supports:
The fact that Congress has thus imposed the same type of re-
striction ... is surely evidence that Congress does not view such a
restriction incompatible with its labor policy; 10 5 When Congress
meant preemption to flow from the 1959 Act it expressly so pro-
vided .... No such preemption provision was provided in connection
with Section 504 (a);106 Section 604 provides that nothing in the
Act shall restrict state criminal enforcement of the same felonies
listed in Section 504; and Section 603 (a) is an express disclaimer
of preemption of state laws regulating the responsibilities of union
officials except where such preemption is expressly provided in the
1959 Act.'07
The Supreme Court also held that the New York statute was not
pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act, for it was based on
an interstate compact ratified by Congress with full knowledge and
104 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
105 Id. at 156.
106 Ibid.
107 Id. at 157.
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consent to the implementing legislation. Hill v. Florida08 was dis-
tinguished for here there was "Congressional approval of the heart of
the state legislative program explicitly brought to its attention and
was part of a program, fully canvassed by Congress through its own
investigations to vindicate a legitimate and compelling state inter-
est.,,lo9
This decision does not, of course, settle the question whether in
the absence of such a compact, a state could regulate qualifications for
union office. Other language suggests that a state may be be able to
"restrict the complete freedom of a group of employees to designate
'representatives of their own choosing.' ""0 Furthermore, enactment
of section 504 evidences that "Congress does not view such a restric-
tion as incompatible with its labor policy""' and this might weigh
heavily in the "adjustment" of interdependent federal and state interests.
State disqualification of prior communists and felons might well be
upheld, but disqualification on other grounds would seem not to be
compatible with Congressional policy and be pre-empted by the
NLRA."2 In the words of the Supreme Court:
The fact that there is some restriction due to the operation of state
law does not settle the issue of preemption. The doctrine of pre-
emption does not present a problem in physics but one of adjust-
ment because of the interdependence of federal and state interests
and the interaction of federal and state powers." 3
DUAL RIGHTS AND DUAL CONSTITUTIONS
Under the statute, certain federal rights are dependent on pro-
visions in the union's constitution. Equal rights can be qualified only
by reasonable rules in the constitution;" 4 trusteeships can be imposed
only for purposes so provided;" 5 elections must be conducted ac-
cording to the union's constitution; 116 and union funds can be used only
108 Supra note 1.
109 DeVeau v. Braisted, supra note 104, at 155.
110 Id. at 152.
11 Id. at 156.
112 In Hill v. Florida, supra note 1, the Court emphasized that Florida not only
prohibited the disqualified business agent from serving but also enjoined the union
from functioning as a bargaining representative under the federal statute. Neither the
majority nor dissent in DeVeau v. Braisted used this element to distinguish Hill v.
Florida. Both ignored this element and treated the mere disqualification of an officer as
a restriction on free choice of representatives.
113 DeVeau v. Braisted, supra note 104, at 152.
114 Section 101(a) (1).
115 Section 302. Failure to follow the procedure required by the constitution destroys
the presumption of validity. Section 304(c).
116 Section 401(a). Officers can be removed only in accordance with the constitution
unless the Secretary has found that procedure inadequate.
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in conformity to that organic law.117 At the same time, state rights
are also governed by the constitution-indeed, the major task of state
law is to enforce compliance with the union's own rules.
The union constitution, however, is not a mathematical formula,
but a vague, incomplete, and ambiguous document requiring judicial
interpretation. On this federal and state law might differ. For example,
ambiguous wording defining the purposes for which union money can
be spent might be interpreted in a federal court as authorizing loans
to a hardpressed employer but interpreted in a state court prohibiting
such a loan. Similarly, an amendment to the constitution reasonably
qualifying equal rights might be found to be validly ratified under
state law but invalidly ratified under federal law. This presents the
problem how these potentially different interpretations should be
handled.
Three alternatives are available. First, the law under which the
particular right was asserted could control. State rights would be
governed by state construction rules and federal rights, by federal
construction rules. This is conceptually awkward because the union
then has not one constitution but two. Although awkward it creates
no irreconcilable conflict between the two bodies of law. Seldom, if
ever, will one interpretation command what the other prohibits; both
can be obeyed." 8 If there is, perchance, such conflict it will be re-
solved as elsewhere in the statute by federal law prevailing.
Second, state law could be allowed to control as to the existence
or meaning of a constitutional clause. Congress considered the union
constitution as the main core of the state law to be preserved and it
found no fault in state court interpretation of it. Allowing state law
to control on this point would not weaken basic guarantees because
the constitution, so interpreted, will still be subordinate to the federally
declared rights. This alternative, however, seems unfitting in election
cases, since pre-emption has eliminated state law in this area and it
should not be revived for purposes of interpreting the election pro-
visions.
Third, federal law could be allowed to control. This, however,
would work a change far beyond the needs, for apart from election
cases, the federal courts will only sporadically have to look to the
union constitution, and then only to a minute fraction of its whole.
L17 Section 501(a).
118 Divergent interpretations of the procedural provisions for establishing trustee-
ship could conceivably cause hardship. If the union followed the federal construction, the
trusteeship would be invalid under state law; if it followed the state construction, the
presumption of validity under federal law would be destroyed. However, the union
could usually comply with both interpretations simultaneously.
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State courts, on the other hand, must apply the constitution to a wide
range of cases far removed from those arising under the federal
statute.
In practical terms, there seems little difference between the first
two alternatives. Election provisions, because of complete pre-emp-
tion, should be governed by federal law in any event. In the other
random cases there is not likely to be significant differences in federal
and state construction rules. Here, as in so many other federal-state
problems under the statute, the difficulties are more conceptual than
real.
DuAL RIGHTS AND DUAL COURTS
Parallel or overlapping rights and remedies under state and fed-
eral law inevitably pose problems of judicial administration. These
problems become most acute when those rights are separately ad-
judicated and enforced by different courts which may duplicate or
work at cross-purposes. Reconciling possibly conflicting rights and
coordination of potentially clashing remedies are simplified if both
sets of rights and remedies are administered by the same court in the
same proceeding.
Internal union cases have four marked characteristics which give
added reason for fully disposing of the dispute in a single proceeding.
First, state and federal rights are often so inseparably intertwined
that separate litigation of those rights must inevitably lead to extensive
duplication. The rights may be so similar that the trial of one will be
a re-run of the trial of the other. Thus, the established state right to
a fair hearing parallels the federal right guaranteed by section 101
(a) (5); the Ohio rule of Crossen v. Duffy" 9 or the New York rule
of Madden v. Atkins120 may approximate the free speech protection
provided by section 101(a)(3); and the fiduciary obligation under
state law may be nearly identical with that imposed by section 501.
Separate trial of these federal and state rights would result in com-
plete duplication. Even though the substantive rights differ, the evi-
dence relevant and necessary to adjudicate them may largely over-
lap. For example, an expelled member may simultaneously claim
that he was not given written specific charges as required by federal
law,121 nor were they signed by the accusing member as required by
the constitution enforced by state law; that the trial body was biased,
122
and was not named in accordance with the union constitution; or,
119 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951).
120 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958).
121 Section 101(a) (5).
122 Ibid.
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that the expulsion was for criticizing the officers,' 23 and the charges
of dual unionism were not supported by substantial evidence. The trial
of one of these simultaneously asserted rights requires almost all of
evidence necessary for the adjudication of the other.
The second marked characteristic of internal union litigation is
that in practice the evidence typically ranges widely to explore the
contours of the underlying dispute. Lawyers commonly seek to present
the case not as an isolated incident, but as a part of the union's in-
ternal life. A study of the cases show that the courts have been willing
to inquire into the background of the dispute and obtain a full picture
of the union's challenged conduct.'2 4 Indeed, the court has no choice
if it is to make a meaningful decision and formulate an appropriate
remedy. This practice of broad inquiry is further encouraged by the
fact that these suits are almost always for equitable relief and tried
without a jury. Because of this nature of proof in internal union
cases, rights which seem to rest on quite dissimilar elements may lead
to the production of identical evidence at the trial; and rights which
seem quite remote in legal terms may be supported by evidence which
extensively overlaps. The duplication in internal union cases, there-
fore, is much greater in fact than theoretical analysis suggests.
Third, the costs of litigation substantially affect the reality of the
rights afforded. The plaintiff is often a union member for whom the
legal costs are a serious obstacle to his asserting his rights. His need
is for a single proceeding to adjudicate all of his rights. Duplication
works a derogation of his rights, for it adds financial obstacles to his
obtaining full protection.
Fourth, the union needs a final settlement of the claimed rights
to resolve the internal dispute. Litigation inevitably generates internal
turmoil and may be deliberately used by factional groups for political
purposes. Piecemeal adjudication prolongs and aggravates the turmoil,
often breeding even further litigation. Full adjudication enables the
union to take corrective action, if any be required, and return to its
primary task of representing its members in collective bargaining.
The primary inquiry here is the extent to which the statute per-
mits or requires both state and federal rights to be determined in the
same proceeding. This depends on the ability to enforce state rights
in federal courts and federal rights in state courts. This in turn,
raises problems of removal from state to federal courts.
123 See § 101(a)(3).
124 For a study of the practices followed in litigating these cases, see Summers, "The
Law of Union Discipline-What The Courts Do In Fact," 70 Yale LJ. 175 (1960).
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A. Enforcement of State Rights in Federal Courts ?
The central question here is to what extent state rights, claimed
in conjunction with federal rights, can be adjudicated in the federal
courts. 12 5 This leads immediately to the shadowland of pendent juris-
diction where federal courts may dispose of a case on non-federal
grounds even though the federal grounds have not been established.'
The test of pendent jurisdiction, under Hum v. Oursler,27 is whether
the federal and state claims are "two distinct grounds in support of a
single cause of action"; 2 and this, in turn, depends largely on the
identity of the facts used to prove the two claims.12 9
Where the state and federal claims are substantially similar-such
as in cases of discipline for suing the union, denial of a fair hearing,
or violation of a fiduciary obligation-there is clearly but one cause of
action. If the state standard were higher than the federal standard, the
federal court would have pendent jurisdiction to enforce the state
right even though the federal right failed.130
125 The federal district courts have jurisdiction without regard to the amount in
controversy under § 1337 of the Judicial Code, 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1958), which gives original jurisdiction "of any civil action or proceeding arising under
any Act of Congress regulating commerce." For the applicability of this to private suits
brought under collective bargaining statutes, see Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Rich-
man Bros., 348 U.S. 643 (1955); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
323 U.S. 210 (1944).
Apart from this, the jurisdictional grant in the statute should be interpreted as
being without regard to the amount in controversy, for the rights to be protected, in
the main, are not susceptible to monetary evaluation. They are in the nature of civil
rights, and requiring a jurisdictional amount would frustrate the clear purpose of Con-
gress to give union members protection in the federal courts. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939).
126 See generally, Moore's Federal Practice § 3, at 1815-17 (1st ed. 1948); Note,
"Jurisdiction in Federal Courts Over Non-Federal Claims When Joined With A Federal
Question," 52 Yale L.J. 922 (1943).
The federal court has jurisdiction even though the complaint fails to state a good
cause of action on the federal claim. All that is required for jurisdiction is that the com-
plaint "is drawn so as to claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of
the United States." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946). The suit might be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction if the federal claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and made
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insub-
stantial and frivolous." Id. at 682.
127 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
128 Id. at 246. The plaintiff claimed a violation of federal rights under the copy-
right statute, and a violation of state rights under the common law of unfair competition.
129 Complete identity of the facts is not required to constitute the same cause of
action for the purpose of pendent jurisdiction. It is enough if the facts are substantially
identical. This leaves undefined the degree of identity required.
10 See, e.g., Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949), where plaintiff
sued under the Interstate Commerce Act and state common law for negligent damage to
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Even though the substantive rights differ, there may still be but
a single cause of action.' 3 ' If a trusteeship is challenged because it is
not for a permissable purpose under section 302, and also because it
was imposed without a hearing as required by state law, the essential
facts to support the two grounds are quite different. There is, however,
but one wrong to be remedied; and the evidence which the court must
in practical terms consider in determining the federal claim will in-
clude almost all, if not all, the evidence required to dispose of the
state claim.' Similarly, a member who claims that his discipline is
in reprisal for exercising his statutory rights may also claim that the
procedure failed to conform to the union constitution. The two claims
are but "two distinct grounds in the same cause of action." There
was but one expulsion; he seeks but one reinstatement; and the trial
of the federal claim will produce at least nine-tenths of all the facts
needed for the state claim.
33
Whether the federal court has pendent jurisdiction is not a con-
ceptual but a practical problem.1'3 The cause of action is not to be
measured by legal theories, but by the dispute which the court is
required to adjudicate; and identity of the evidence used to prove the
two claims must be determined not by examining essential allegations
of counts in the complaint, but by examining the evidence practically
livestock. The court held that it had pendent jurisdiction over the state claim even
though the federal claim was decided against the plaintiff.
131 See, e.g., Markert v. Swift & Co., 187 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1951), where plaintiff
claimed the defendant by failing to provide employees uniforms had violated the Federal
Meat Inspection Regulations and also a collective bargaining agreement-then considered
a state claim. The court at page 107 of the opinion held that although "the legal source
of the alleged duty differs, in one case the claim being that it is imposed by federal
law and in the other by the common law contracts" there was but a single cause of
action and the court had pendent jurisdiction.
132 See, e.g., Jacobs v. North La. Gulf. Ry. Co., 69 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. La. 1946)
where an injured employee sued under the Federal Employers Liability Act and the
State Workmens Compensation Act. The former required proof of negligence and allowed
recovery of full damages, but the latter did not require negligence and limited recovery
to a statutory amount. The court at page 8 of the opinion held that "having acquired
jurisdiction for the former issue, it would continue for decision of the latter."
'33 See, e.g., South Side Theatres v. United West Coast Theatres, 178 F.2d 648 (9th
Cir. 1949), where plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action claimed that the contract
was illegal under the Sherman Act, and also that it had been cancelled according to its
termination clause. The court held that even though the federal ground was not estab-
lished by the evidence, the court could retain jurisdiction and dispose on the non-federal
ground.
134 See Shulnan & Jaegerman, "Some jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Pro-
cedure," 45 Yale L.J. 393 (1936); Note, "Federal jurisdiction Over A Non-Federal Issue
When joined With A Federal Question," 34 Minn. L. Rev. 559 (1950). All of the writing
in the field has favored a liberal and practical application of pendent jurisdiction. See also
authorities cited supra note 126.
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required at trial to enable the court to act responsibly and effectively.
The need to avoid wasteful duplication of judicial effort, to reduce the
costs of litigation for the parties, and to obtain a prompt final settle-
ment of the internal union dispute all require that in these cases
pendent jurisdiction not be niggardly granted."3 5
Apart from pendent jurisdiction, federal courts may also adjudi-
cate state rights as a necessary part of adjudicating federal rights.
For example, a union member may sue in the federal courts to compel
the local officers and the local's attorney to repay legal fees paid to
effect a secession of the local. Whether the payment was a violation
of fiduciary obligation under federal law may depend on whether the
local had a right to secede under state law. The federal court in order
to decide the federal claim must also decide the state claim.'36
B. Enforcement of Federal Rights in State Courts
Legislative history gives no explicit guide on whether actions to
enforce federal rights could be brought in state courts. The question
was never raised or discussed either in the committee reports or the
floor debate. This very silence, however, suggests that Congress had
no clear or considered intent to make jurisdiction in the federal courts
exclusive.
The statutory language, though ambivalent, points toward con-
current jurisdiction. The enforcement section of the Bill of Rights
provides that "Any person whose rights . . . have been infringed...
may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States .... 11137
The clause permitting private suits in trusteeship cases similarly pro-
vides that the plaintiff "may bring a civil action" in the federal
courts. 38 The use of the term "may" in this context indicates con-
current and not exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. 39
135 It has been argued that the federal court is not compelled to decide the state
question, but has discretion to refuse to decide the pendent issue, and might exercise
that discretion when the federal claim is dismissed prior to trial, for this would cause
little inconvenience to the parties. See Note, "Discretionary Federal Jurisdiction," 46 Ill.
L. Rev. 646 (1951). This overlooks the element of delay which is of special importance in
internal union cases, and which should be given weight if the motion to dismiss is not
made at an early stage in the proceedings.
136 See, e.g., Marosky v. Bethlehem Hingham Shipyard, 177 F.2d 529 (1st Cir. 1949),
where plaintiff sued for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Determining
the overtime pay required determining the regular rate of pay under the employment
contract which was governed by state law. The court, having decided this state question
in order to decide the federal claim, had pendent jurisdiction to award the amount of
base pay due under state law.
137' Section 102.
138 Section 304(a).
139 See Moore's Federal Practice at 227-36, 2017 (2d ed. 1959); Note, "Exclusive
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1957).
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In two places, the statute expressly provides for concurrent juris-
diction, superficially creating an inference that jurisdiction is other-
wise exclusive. The history of these two provisions, however, reverses
the inference. One provision, which allowed union members to sue
for violation of fiduciary obligations, 14° was added to the Kennedy-
Ives Bill during the 1958 Senate debate.'41 At that time it was the
only federal right enforceable by private action, and the express pro-
vision for concurrent jurisdiction was apparently written out of an
excess of caution to require not only federal but state courts to enter-
tain these suits. The other provision, which permitted union members
to compel inspection of books and records,' 42 was added in the final
stages of evolution of the bill by the House Committee in 1959.'
It was the last private action incorporated into the statute and again
expressly provided for concurrent jurisdiction.
Nothing in any of the reports or debates suggests that these two
particular federal rights were to be placed on a different footing from
other federal rights created by the bill. The variations do not represent
purposeful differences, but sporadic excesses of caution disclosing an
implicit understanding that all private actions to enforce rights under
the act could be brought in either federal or state courts.
No persuasive policies argue against this result. The state courts
are fully competent to adjudicate and enforce these rights; they have
in fact had far more experience with internal union disputes than
federal courts. There is no reason to fear that they will be unfriendly
to the federal claims; rather, close study of state cases suggests that
they have sought to manipulate the common law doctrines to achieve
results approximating the federal rights.'44
On the contrary, there are strong practical reasons for finding
concurrent jurisdiction, the most compelling of which are rooted in the
need to adjudicate interlaced federal and state rights in the same
proceeding. The plaintiff ought not be driven to double litigation
in separate courts simply because his state claim is so separate from
his federal claim as to fall outside the pendent jurisdiction of the
federal court. Neither should he be permitted to litigate twice the
same cause of action based on parallel federal and state claims by
first suing on his state right in the state court and then suing on his
140 Section 501(b).
141 104 Cong. Rec. 11327-29 (daily ed. June 16, 1958).
142 Section 201(c).
143 H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(c) (1959). The House Report accom-
panying the bill, H.R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), did not even mention
this sub-section, except in its section by section analysis.
144 See Summers, supra note 124.
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federal right in the federal court. These, however, would follow if
the state court lacked concurrent jurisdiction. On the other hand,
if federal rights are enforceable in state courts, the plaintiff can com-
bine causes of action and litigate the entire dispute in one proceeding.
At the same time, adjudication will bring a measure of repose to the
union, for final judgment on a cause of action will be res adjudicata
on both the state and federal grounds which could have been relied
upon to support it.
In view of the legislative history, reinforced by the compelling
practical need on the part of the courts and both of the parties to
facilitate the full settlement of the dispute in a single proceeding, it
seems reasonably clear that the statute should be interpreted as making
federal rights enforceable in state courts.
C. Removal of Actions from State Courts
Actions in the state court can combine a wide range of claims, both
federal and state, within the limits of the state's procedural rules
permitting joinder of causes of action. Thus, an international union
might charge the local officers with corruption, remove them from office,
install a trustee and order the local consolidated with another local,
and then discipline members who refused to cooperate. The officers and
disciplined members might sue in the state court to enjoin the con-
solidation, remove the trusteeship, recover union office and reinstate
the disciplined members. If the complaint alleges any violation of
the federal statute, the whole action can be removed by the defendant
to the federal court.
145
A state claim paralleling an asserted federal claim and constitut-
ing but a distinct ground in support of a single cause of action within
the meaning of Hurn v. Oursler,141 would be removable on the basis of
original federal jurisdiction."'4 State claims which constitute separate
and independent causes of action would be removable along with
the other claims,' 48 but the federal court could in its discretion remand
145 No amount in controversy is required for removal because the federal court has
original jurisdiction regardless of the amount in controversy, supra note 125. See Moore's
Commentary On The U.S. Judicial Code 228 (1949).
146 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
147 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958). See Lewin, "The Federal
Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of 'Separate And Independent' Non-Federal
Causes of Action," 66 Harv. L. Rev. 422, 424-26 (1953).
148 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958). Removal under this subsection
includes cases in which federal jurisdiction over the non-state cause of action is based
on a federal question. Note, "Removal Under Section 1441(c) of The Judicial Code," 52
Col. L. Rev. 101 (1952). It has been suggested that certain intermediate types of state
claims might be considered as separate causes of action under Hum v. Oursler, supra
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those claims to the state court. In exercising that discretion, one of the
critical considerations should be the enveloping nature of proof in these
cases and the need for the courts to inquire into the underlying dispute
within the union which gave birth to the litigation. In practical terms,
there is but a single dispute with multiple maneuvers and counter-
actions. To parcel up the dispute according to concepts of cause of
action will result in trying it piecemeal and defeat all the values which
have been emphasized above for adjudicating the whole dispute in
a single proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The Labor Reform Act marks a new frontier in the law of pre-
emption, for it represents a serious effort by Congress to define and
coordinate the relative roles of federal and state law through statutory
provisions. Congress had few guides to follow, but the exploratory
efforts here may provide experience which will give guides for the
future. 14 9
Congress did not, and could not, work out in detail the coordina-
tion of federal and state law. To do so would require at the very least
a comprehensive knowledge of existing state law and the kinds of cases
which came before the courts. Furthermore, it would require a clear
understanding by Congress of what it was prescribing as federal law.
Congress lacked both of these since such precision of knowledge and
understanding is not possible. State law in this area is amorphous and
deceptive, burdened with outworn doctrines and "Janus-faced" rules.
Any statute must be cast in flexible terms to be fitted to the needs
of the unlimited variety of problems which may arise. Congress, then,
was confronted with the task of coordinating two bodies of law whose
contents were inevitably imprecisely known. The most that it could
do was to indicate in broad terms the pattern of coordination and
adjustment.
This leaves a large job for the courts; they must work out the
details of coordination and make the adjustment in particular cases.
The courts' role is the customary one of elaborating legislation. It is
peculiarly appropriate here, for courts have a special responsibility to
coordinate competing bodies of law subject to review by the Supreme
Court, the arbiter of the federal system.
The courts, in approaching this task, must recognize that Congress
note 146, but not "separate and independent" under § 1441(c), and neither the state nor
federal claim could be removed. Lewin supra note 147, at 431. Such an anomalous result
would seem unlikely. Where federal jurisdiction was based on federal question, sub-
section (c) should take up where subsection (b) leaves off. "Removal Under Section
1441(c) of The Judicial Code," supra.
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did not give them a blueprint with specifications, but rather general
guides. Answers can not be distilled from the words of the savings
clauses, but must be projected from their broad thrusts of purpbse.
Neither section 103 nor section 603(a) can be applied literally in all
cases, but must be applied to achieve their central purpose of maximum
protection of individual rights. The wording of section 403 may be
misleading unless it is read in the light of the overriding purpose to
create a uniform body of law regulating elections. Above all, the courts
have a primary responsibility to make the coordination of federal and
state law work to achieve the objectives sought by Congress; and not,
out of hostility to the act or its efforts to preserve protections under
state law, use the words of Congress to defeat its objectives.
Coexistence of state and federal law obviously presents complex
problems, although probably no more difficult and less unsettling than
would have been created by complete pre-emption. The preconceived
fears of conflict between the two bodies of law appear, upon more
careful analysis, to be far less than imagined, because for the most
part the two levels of protection do not clash but reinforce and sup-
plement each other. Only in rare situations does one law command
that which the other prohibits, and when that occurs the conflict is
simply resolved by giving primacy to the federal command. Apart
from intricate procedural knots created by enforcement of dual rights
in both federal and state courts, most of the difficult problems exist
more in the realm of theory and artificial hypotheticals than in the
realm of practical reality. None of the problems are beyond the or-
dinary competence of courts to resolve.
